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PROPERTY, CONTRACTS, AND POLITICS
Mark Tushnet*
DEGREES OF FREEDOM: LOUISIANA AND CUBA AFTER SLAVERY.

By Rebecca

J.Scott. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press. 2005. Pp. xi,
365. $29.95.
INTRODUCTION

Rebecca Scott' is a historian, not an economist. Describing how a dispute over a mule's ownership was resolved, Professor Scott reproduces a
receipt two claimants left when they took the mule from the plantation
whose manager claimed it as well (p. 185). By contrast, analyzing property
relations in the pre-Civil War American South, economic historian Jenny
Wahl observes, "[E]conomic historians tend to [use] ...frequency tables,
graphs, and charts."2 The differences in visual aids to understanding indicate
the various ways historians and economists approach a single topic-the
relation between markets and politics, the latter defined to include the deployment of collective force. Professor Scott's theme is the mutual
dependence of markets and politics in post-emancipation Louisiana and
Cuba. Professor Scott examines post-emancipation Louisiana and Cuba,
which are similar in some respects and different in others. Sugar production
was important in both locations, for example, but the politics of freedom
differed: In Louisiana freedom resulted from the North's defeat of the South
in a civil war, whereas in Cuba it resulted from an independence struggle by
Cubans, including slaves, against colonial domination.3 Few economists
would disagree with many of the propositions that they would extract from
her narrative. Yet the tension between narrativeand proposition is apparent.
This Review explores some aspects of that tension. Part I describes in
largely economic terms some aspects of the post-emancipation property arrangements that Professor Scott describes historically. Relying on Professor
Scott's descriptions in Part II, I sketch why her insistence on the mutual dependence of markets and politics is correct, with some speculation about
why a division of labor among economists leads many economicsinfluenced legal scholars to underemphasize that dependence. It would be
foolish to claim, and I do not, that only a historian could illuminate the
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mutual dependence of markets and politics. Rather, the historian's narratives
and the economist's propositions shed light on that phenomenon from different angles.
One way of putting the differences is this: the historian offers narratives
that the economist sees as instantiations of the kinds of general propositions
economists capture in their equations. 4 Economists worry, though, that, lacking the discipline imposed by some well-specified theory, historians include
in their narratives matters that more rigorous analysis would show to be irrelevant to the larger story the historian is telling-chance events such as the
weather conditions on a particular day that lack the causal significance that
the historian's narrative implicitly imputes to them simply by including
them in the story.
While the economist offers general propositions, historians in turn worry
that the economists' equations may provide accurate depictions of aggregate
behavior, but exclude too much individual human experience that might be
relevant to the larger story. Historians tend to be theory-skeptics, at least in
the modest sense that they doubt that the theories we now have at hand are
the ultimate theories that will account for the behavior they observe in history. They include material in their narratives that they sense might be
important in the end, even if they do not yet have a full set of propositions
that explain the material's relevance.
Finally, historians are devoted to what economists would call small-N
studies, that is, studies with few observations, on which one cannot reliably
establish general propositions. Professor Scott's study has but two observations. Although some economists would be dismissive of a study that, as
they view it, has only two data points, good economists appreciate small-N
studies because they can suggest hypotheses that might be tested by examining a larger number of cases. Yet, economists have "priors" about which
hypotheses are likely to be testable, and so will extract "economic-like" hypotheses from the historian's narrative more readily than they will extract
other hypotheses. And when the economists do so, historians may see the
6
economists as strikingly narrow.

4.

I note that there are quite deep epistemological issues that I elide here. In particular, the

position I sketch takes no position on whether there is a way of knowing things, usually described
by the term Verstehen or as "apprehending" or "grasping" truth, independent of knowledge gained
by the application of general laws-what I have been calling propositions-to facts. The differences
I describe all arise within an epistemology that does not necessarily include Verstehen as a way of

knowing.
5.
An example is Professor Scott's discussion of the details of the Louisiana constitutional
convention's disfranchisement of African Americans in 1898. Pp. 154-66. Throughout the discussion, Professor Scott alludes to the existence of, and difficulty of maintaining, cross-racial and

cross-class political alliances. As I argue later in this Review, the connection between politics and
markets is one of Professor Scott's central themes, and the existence of cross-racial and cross-class
alliances is obviously important in politics generally. Yet, precisely how and why such alliances

arose and were blocked remains more obscure in Professor Scott's account than do the hows and
whys of other themes.
6.

This is not a conceptual point about the differences between history and economics as

academic subjects, but an empirical one, which I believe to be well founded.

April 2007]

Property, Contracts, and Politics

1225

I. THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY AND CONTRACT

Slavery was, among other things, a system of organizing the use of labor
in farming and other forms of production. But, referring to Cuban planters
(though true in Louisiana as well) Professor Scott writes, "[T]hey did have
to face the reality that in the long run some other form of organization of
labor would need to be developed" (p. 95). What follows are some descriptions of arrangements that arose to replace slavery.
Some farmers in Cuba owned their own land and sold their sugar cane to
larger plantations and refiners. In Professor Scott's words, the contracts
provid[ed] for a share of the benefits to go to the individual grower but
pegg[ed] remuneration to the price of sugar in order to minimize the financial risk for mill owners. The mill would make advances, supervise certain
aspects of the growing, and receive the cane, settling the account once a
season. (p. 117)
Although Professor Scott describes these contracts as "draconian," one
of the cane purchasers "complained that the 'colonos [farmers] are giving us
much more trouble than we anticipated ... refus[ing] to sign new contracts
unless we
make them large advances, for more than their property is
7
worth.' ,
An officer of the U.S. occupation forces in Cuba more than a decade
later offered a rich description of labor arrangements:
"[T]he wages.., are not sufficient to enable a man to support a family and
save enough to buy the yoke of oxen, cart, plow, and pony, necessary to his
independence." He reported that "the laborers are not even allowed to cultivate gardens as they would then spend less of their wages at the Owner's
Store; on other estates they are given land and encouraged to an independence which however stops just short of selling them the land." A laborer
might occupy land rent free "in consideration of his being available for
employment on an Ingenio [the estate's refinery]," or farm on shares, or
occasionally pay a small rent. (p. 181)
What system would work best for which industries was largely unknown
because the use of slave labor had impeded development of parallel free
labor systems. Consider sugar: Someone had to raise the sugar cane and
transfer its ownership or possession to a refiner, who would produce the
final product. Experience under slavery made it clear that refining could be
done most effectively in large-scale factories. Beyond that, owners of capital, factory workers, and field workers would have to figure out what forms
of labor organization were most efficient.
Plainly, factory workers would not bring anything other than their labor
to the production process, but even there, should they be paid a fixed hourly,
weekly, or seasonal wage, or should there be some sort of piece work
7. P. 117. I wonder about the complaint's accuracy: If the amount demanded for "advances"
actually did exceed the property's value, one would think that the cane purchaser would try to purchase the land directly. Presumably the complaint is overstated, and the cane purchaser did not want
to buy the land and then work it himself or through wage workers.
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system? Possibilities for raising sugar cane were even more varied. A cane
field could be owned by the person who worked it, with the product sold to
the refinery. The field could be leased from the refiner or a third party for a
fixed rental. The sugar farmer could be a sharecropper, paying a variable
rental fee and receiving a variable amount for the sugar he raised. And layered over all these possibilities were additional variations for buying the
supplies needed to operate the sugar farm and the necessities of life. For
example, a tenant could be allowed to raise pigs for home consumption, or
could be prohibited from doing so. Professor Scott offers this description of
what happened on one estate:
In June an old wall on the estate was taken down, leaving the "negros pig
styes without protection so they will have to sell them or have them stolen
it is imeterial [sic] to us which." Unsurprisingly, within a few weeks [the
estate's manager] was reporting "a good deal of trouble with the negros
who want me to pay them at the rate of $3 1/2 per month for having taken
from them the raising of pigs for sale." (p. 112)
On what basis would the labor arrangements be chosen? In part, of
course, these arrangements would be determined by the industry's characteristics. Sugar refining could not go on without a labor arrangement that
would bring large numbers of workers together under the supervision of a
production manager. But, perhaps more important, the arrangements would
be chosen on the basis of risk and with the possibility of opportunism.
Compare a contract to pay a worker a fixed wage with a sharecropping
contract, in a world where natural disasters such as hurricanes can destroy a
crop or where exogenous changes in demand can drive prices up or down
substantially. The contract will determine who bears the consequences of the
risk if it comes about. Similarly, different contracts provide different opportunities for opportunism, usually described as "shirking" when we talk
about workers and "exploitation"-often of informational advantageswhen we talk about employers. Describing one former slave in Cuba, Professor Scott writes, "In the year after she achieved formal freedom, her wage
rose from 3 pesos a month to 8, but she did not work at all on the estate
from June through December of 1886, in contrast to the year before" (p.
111). Here, it seems, the wage increase compensated for assumption of a
greater risk of unemployment.
Professor Scott provides many examples of diverse contractual forms.
William James leased a plantation in Louisiana for three years, and organized a work force of over eighty men and women who "partner[ed] with him
in the hiring and working of it."8 "Planters ...were 'generally averse to
leasing land to the freedmen,'" who were in turn unwilling to agree to annual wage contracts, and eventually arranged for wages paid at least
monthly (p. 37). Elsewhere, an employer paid workers the wages they had

8. P. 37. I would not place too much weight on the term partner in this quotation, but the
author's distinction between "working" and "hiring" is suggestive.
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accumulated over three months. 9 Facing resistance from former slaves who
refused to work unless they could raise vegetables and other staples, one
planter "' [g]ave the negroes their land' "--thatis, allowed them to use portions of the property they leased from him for their domestic purposes (p.

38).
II.

ENFORCING PROPERTY AND CONTRACT RIGHTS: POLITICS

Eventually labor arrangements would stabilize, as workers and owners
of land and physical capital came to understand their risk preferences and
risks of opportunism, and as inefficient labor arrangements were competed
away. In the early days after emancipation, though, nobody knew what arrangements would make sense for the long haul. This placed everyone at
real risk. More than would be true in a stable economy, the parties might
choose a contractual arrangement that seemed sensible but turned out to be
quite bad, and one or the other side would want to get out of the duties it
imposed. What then? Most of us today would think the answer obvious: the
disgruntled party would go to court to enforce the agreement.' ° Professor
Scott shows why going to court might not have been immediately available
in Louisiana and Cuba.
Courts become available to enforce contracts only as a result of political
action-which, in turn, sometimes depends on the labor arrangements in
place. In this way markets and politics are mutually dependent. The classical
definition of civil rights makes the point transparent. In the usage of the
mid- and late-nineteenth century, the term referred to the right to own property and the right to enter into contracts, both located in the private
economy, but also to the right to sue and, importantly, the right to testify in
court." The reason is clear: without the ability to present one's case to the
courts, the rights to contract and property would be empty ones, existing at
the sufferance of the people with whom one contracted. Making a narrow
point with much broader implications, Professor Scott points out, "[a]ny
cross-racial movement that might need a modicum of legal protection.., to
survive... was left utterly vulnerable" (pp. 198-99).
Two examples of contracts I described earlier make clear the connection
between contracts and the assumption that they will be enforced. According
to Professor Scott, in the case of the payments of three months' accumulated
wages, withholding monthly wage payments "had been illegal" during the
period just before the contracts were signed, when workers were in formal
apprenticeships, and she intimates that withholding such payments from free
workers would be a fortiori illegal (p. 116). The estate manager who had
9. P. 116. Professor Scott says that "[m]onthly salaries had evidently been withheld," although it might be that the contracts were for payment at three-month intervals.
10. Alternatively, we might rely on stable norms enforced by social sanctions. Such norms
and sanctions were unavailable in the fluid and racially divided societies Professor Scott describes.
(Thanks to Adrian Vermeule for this observation.)
11. For a discussion, see Mark Tushnet, The Politics of Equality in ConstitutionalLaw: The
Equal ProtectionClause, Dr Du Bois, and Charles Hamilton Houston, 74 J. AM. HiST. 884 (1987).
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trouble with workers who wanted to raise pigs or get higher pay "put three
of their 'ringleaders' in the stocks-a procedure outlawed some years before" (p. 112).
The managers in these instances were able to get away with these illegal
or at least highly questionable practices because their workers did not have
effective access to the courts. The entire thrust of Professor Scott's narrative
is showing how the emancipated populations in Louisiana and Cuba mobilized politically, in part precisely to ensure that they would be able to protect
their rights as free workers. Because political action had broader implications as well, in only a few examples does Professor Scott's treatment of
politics focus expressly on access to the courts. She describes the willingness of the courts "[i]n the majority black, strongly Republican parish of
Terrebonne" to enforce the priority created by workmen's liens for workers'
claims against their employers' property" (p. 48). The workmen's lien, Professor Scott observes, gave workers a "powerful tool," but using it "required
that freedpeople get a fair hearing in the local courts, which in turn required
maintaining the judicial standing and public respect that conservatives were
bent on denying them" (p. 48).
Because the forms of labor arrangements that individuals made varied
widely, and because choices were fluid in the state of economic and legal
uncertainty that prevailed after emancipation, for free labor to flourish, the
legal system had to enforce whatever contracts workers made, but did not
have to assess the fairness of the contracts themselves. This rather modest
aspect of freedom could be satisfied, Professor Scott shows, only if the freed
workers had sufficient political power:
In the years after slavery various possibilities were open.... As long as the
struggle had a strong electoral and labor dimension, as it did in Louisiana
during Reconstruction, or involved a cross-racial movement for national
independence, as it did in Cuba, it remained a true contest. White supremacy was a political project ...[that] required legal backing right up to the
top of the system. (pp. 258-59).

As I have suggested, today we simply assume that courts will be available to enforce contracts, and look to labor economists and students of
industrial organization to analyze why particular labor arrangements make2
sense for specific industries and for people with particular risk preferences.1
We relegate the task of analyzing the development of courts and other political institutions to political economists, and even those scholars tend to
focus on the normal operation of legislatures and courts, examining the conditions under which courts function effectively only when their attention is
directed to crisis or transitional settings-such as post-emancipation Louisiana and Cuba. But even then, they do not go back to examine the connection
between the courts they analyze and labor arrangements, as Professor Scott
does in her historian's manner.
12.
My comments in this paragraph are based on the impressions I have had on reading what
seem to me to be separate bodies of work by economists, who deal with contracting and labor arrangements, and by political economists, who deal with the creation and operation of courts.
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Professor Scott recounts the stories, familiar to specialists in Louisianan
and Cuban history, of suffrage struggles and their contrasting outcomes. In
Louisiana, enfranchisement following emancipation was preserved as long
as Republicans controlled the national government. After Reconstruction's
end, disfranchisement became a primary goal of Louisiana's racial and social conservatives. They first accomplished a statutory disfranchisement,
then embedded their success in Louisiana's 1898 constitution, which combined facially race-neutral restrictions on the franchise, such as literacy and
property requirements, with a "grandfather clause," which allowed people
who had the right to vote in 1867 (before Congress extended the right to
vote to African-American men) and their heirs to "acquire a permanent right
to vote, without meeting the literacy and property requirements otherwise
introduced by the new constitution" (pp. 163-64). Reflecting the crossracial military alliances that had prevailed against the Spanish colonial regime and carried through during the U.S. occupation, the Cuban
Constitution of 1901-1902 created universal manhood suffrage, to the slight
discomfort of the occupying forces (pp. 205-06).
The right to vote mattered not because voters could use it to obtain special interest legislation, but because without it they could not protect the
civil rights they were nominally guaranteed. Suffrage "served as an important buffer against antidemocratic temptations and provided the framework
within which a multitude of labor, mutual-aid, and educational associations
... could proliferate" (pp. 258-60). The right to vote "carried with it ...
political leverage ... [that] spread out into other realms of action, and particularly to the exercise of collective bargaining and of access to law" (p.
260). Again, I would stress how modest these claims really are: politics mattered because it allowed for the access to law that made meaningful the
contracts free workers signed.
Legal protection for forms of labor flowed from political power, but
forms of labor also affected the ability of workers to exercise political
power. The clearest example Professor Scott provides comes from her
treatment of gang wage labor.
The same labor segmentation that fenced black workers into specific
jobs and not others created spaces in which solidarity could be constructed
and enforced by the workers themselves: "Living in the planter-owned quarters, though otherwise a source of vulnerability, had an organizational
advantage, for it made communication quick and group action feasible" (p.

83).
One need not agree With the connotations of the term fenced into to see
how gang wage labor had political implications, as, of course, did the vulnerability of the workers to expulsion from their housing. Conservatives in
Louisiana understood that labor segmentation had political consequences:
"Potential alliances would be thwarted, and civic silence enforced selectively upon black workers" (p. 88). But, as Professor Scott immediately
notes, "it was easier said than done" (p. 88). The reason, I think, is that markets, while dependent on politics for their basic operation, also have some
freedom from politics. Workers' risk preferences and human capital
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endowments are not determined by race, and sustaining a racially segmented
market under conditions of free labor (where workers have access to the
courts) is quite difficult.
Much of Professor Scott's narrative, particularly its treatment of Cuba,
deals with the details of constructing cross-racial political alliances, and
alliances between workers in the countryside and workers in urban areas.13
As she writes, "[Tihe links between structures and outcomes are rarely simple" (p. 153). The military struggle for national independence in Cuba
created conditions for cross-racial political alliances that were absent in
Louisiana, and, more important for present purposes, probably was a more
significant factor in sustaining such alliances than the forms of labor on
which I have focused were. Again, the historian's interest in granular detail
is in tension with the social scientist's interest in generalization.
Early in her discussion, Professor Scott observes, "Each new initiative
[by rural workers] ... threatened elements of white supremacy on two
fronts: the workplace and the public sphere" (pp. 82-83). This is a pretty
good summary of the idea that markets (the workplace) and politics (the
public sphere) are mutually dependent. That idea pervades, indeed it might
be said to constitute the main theme of, Degrees of Freedom. At the same
time, we should note that Professor Scott's rich descriptions of contracting
processes, politics, and race resist reduction to the economist's propositions-to the explanatory sketches I have laid out in this Review-even as
they generate such propositions.
CONCLUSION

I have examined Professor Scott's work with a quite narrowly focused
lens. I have been, I think, reasonably self-conscious about my interest in
extracting propositions from Degrees of Freedom, in the service of the contrast I have drawn between the historian's and the economist's sensibility.
My summaries of contracts omit even the names of the parties and the plantations they worked on, for example, and Professor Scott's different practice
reflects the historian's sensibility that details matter.
I should conclude, therefore, by emphasizing how elegantly she has constructed Degrees of Freedom. She gracefully brings the limitations of
historical knowledge to our attention. For example, from the fact that census
records reveal their residences and common last names, she infers that several individuals who resided near each other after emancipation were slaves
on the same plantation, and notes that inferential step.14 Her subtle references to what we do not and cannot know about the past remind us that

13. See, e.g., p. 78 (describing the construction of alliances between activists in the countryside and in the towns).
14. See pp. 23-24 (naming the Albis/Sarria family as the owners of the Soledad plantation);
p. 119 (identifying residents of a town with the surname Sarria as former slaves from the Soledad
plantation).
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there is much we do not-and probably cannot-know about the present or
about the general propositions economists urge on us.
Degrees of Freedom is in part comparative history by juxtaposition, examining how similar issues-labor arrangements in the sugar industry, the
distribution of the franchise in a racially divided society-were resolved in
places that were similar yet different. But it is also comparative history by
connection. 5 Professor Scott describes Cubans who spent time in Louisiana
and Louisianans who spent time in Cuba. 6 The military commander who
served for twenty-four hours as the military governor of New Orleans in
1874 becomes the first U.S. military governor of Cuba in 1899 (p. 155).
Professor Scott builds on these personal connections to enhance our appreciation of the thematic 7resonances between the Louisianan and Cuban
portions of her narrative.
The very elegance of Professor Scott's presentation shows how historians can contribute to our understanding of economic practices. A diagram or
chart might help some of us, but the photographs and details Professor Scott
provides will help others.

15.

E.g., p. 4 ("[T]he stories become intertwined rather than juxtaposed .....

16.

See, e.g., pp. 2-4.

17.

I use the singular here deliberately.

1232

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 105:1223

